Hot spot policing is a popular policing strategy that addresses crime by assigning limited police resources to areas where crimes are more highly concentrated. We evaluate this strategy using a game theoretic approach. The main argument against focusing police resources on hot spots is that it would simply displace criminal activity from one area to another. We provide new insights on the nature of the displacement e¤ect with useful implications for the econometric analysis of crime-reduction e¤ects of police reallocation.
Introduction
Crime mapping is a powerful tool used by analysts in law enforcement agencies to visualize and study crime patterns. Such maps indicate that crimes are often not evenly distributed across geographic locations. Instead, clusters of crimes occur in speci…c areas, or hot spots.
Hot spot policing is a place-based strategy that attempts to reduce crime by assigning limited police resources to places where crimes are more highly concentrated. This approach to crime prevention is relatively new and many crime experts argue it is one of the main reasons why New York City has achieved a dramatic decrease in crimes during the past two decades. 1 We evaluate this policy via a game theoretic approach and propose alternative strategies that display interesting features in terms of geographic spillovers of crime reduction. Our results o¤er useful hints to guide further empirical research.
The model we develop to study the e¤ectiveness of hot spot policing incorporates various crime theories that capture di¤erent aspects of crime decisions. These theories have been so far studied in isolation and, by combining them in a single model, we are able to make predictions that are more consistent with observed patterns of crimes. Speci…cally, our approach is based on the rational choice model and uses game theory to incorporate strategic interactions among potential o¤enders into the analysis. We also borrow from the theory of environmental criminology, which highlights the role of spatial factors in the choice of crime location. More formally, we propose a two-stage game. We …rst divide the region under study into a …nite number of areas that di¤er in terms of attractiveness for potential o¤enders. For instance, if the overall region represents NY City, then an area may correspond to one of its neighborhoods. We capture crime attractiveness via two attributes, namely, risk of apprehension and potential productivity. The riskiness of a place for a potential o¤ender can be thought of as an index function that captures structural factors a¤ecting the successful apprehension of o¤enders in that location, such as the presence of illumination or video cameras. The second attribute, potential productivity, relates to the expected gains from committing a crime in that place, such as the presence of a shopping mall or a bank. In the …rst period of the two-stage game, the enforcement agency decides how to allocate the limited police resources across alternative areas. In the second period, upon observing police allocation, people decide 1 See, e.g., Zimring (2011). whether to commit a crime and, in case of doing so, where to perform the criminal act.
Using the standard backward induction principle we solve the game by …rst modeling people's choices for a given police assignment. Given the strategic interactions in crime decisions, this stage of the game is itself a game among potential o¤enders. The …rst part of our work sheds light on one of the most controversial issues associated with hot spot policing, namely, the displacement e¤ect. That is, the possibility that redirecting police resources to hot spots would simply displace criminal activity from one area to another. 2 Empirical research has found some evidence against this argument (see, e.g., Braga (2008) ).
The model we provide features this empirical observation when the value of the outside option (not to commit a crime) does not depend on the number of people who opt not to become a criminal. Under this circumstance, the value of the outside option regulates people's utilities, and increasing resources in an area simply discourages people in that area from committing a crime. Alternatively, when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects, increasing police resources in a given area pushes some criminals from this area to the others. Congestion e¤ects in the outside option might occur if, for instance, an increment in the number of people searching for a legal job pushes salaries down or increases unemployment, thereby making this outside option less attractive. The last result raises a simultaneity issue in the empirical studies that address the e¤ect of police levels on crime reduction by using cross-sectional data. Speci…cally, the crime rate in each area depends not only on the police resources allocated to that speci…c location, but on the whole vector of police allocation.
After we characterize the decisions of potential o¤enders, we go back to the …rst stage of the game and contrast the behavior of an enforcement agency that aims to reduce the overall crime rate with the one of a public authority that wants to reduce crime di¤erences across areas. We interpret the latter as an extreme implementation of hot spot policing. We …nd that the optimal police allocation does not necessarily induce an even distribution of crimes across areas. In other words, though areas that are a priori more attractive to o¤enders (i.e., display a larger productivity-to-risk ratio) receive indeed more police attention, the extra e¤orts in these areas do not fully o¤set the impact of their initial structural di¤erences. Thus, in our model, some hot spots remain under the optimal allocation strategy. This result is robust to all the extensions we consider for our initial model. In particular, it remains valid independently of the displacement e¤ects. Regarding the opportunity cost of the egalitarian policy, we …nd that it increases with the variability of the productivity-to-risk ratio across locations.
We then study an alternative place-based strategy. Speci…cally, we analyze the implications of introducing structural changes that aim to reduce the productivity-to-risk ratio of a certain area. This policy has been suggested by a number of crime theorists, including Braga and Wisburd (2010), who state that:
"The attributes of a place are viewed as key factors in explaining clusters of criminal events... To reduce and better manage problems at crime hot spots, the police need to change the underlying conditions, situations, and dynamics that make them attractive to criminals and disorderly persons."
We …nd that this policy reduces crime not only in the target area but also in all other locations.
Positive (or negative) external e¤ects of structural changes have been proposed earlier (see, e.g., Ehrlich (1973) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) ). An interesting aspect of our result is the mechanism that produces this outcome. The direct e¤ect of the policy is to make the target area less attractive for potential o¤enders, thereby reducing its criminal activity. The indirect e¤ect is due to subsequent police reallocation from the improved area to the other ones, where the criminal activity diminishes as well. In other words, structural improvements in an area generate geographic spillovers of crime reduction in all other locations via optimal police reallocation.
We …nally consider various extensions to our initial model. The outside option people face (not to commit a crime) can be interpreted as the possibility to get a legal job. We introduce alternative speci…cations of the outside option and study the e¤ects of improvements in the job market on the proportion of people who opt not to commit a crime, e.g., the labor supply of the economy. 3 We also investigate the consequences of reversing the interaction e¤ects among potential o¤enders. We show that, when interactions are positive-as in Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996) and Sah (1991)-interventions become a delicate matter. The reason is 3 Our theoretical results are consistent with empirical …ndings. See, for instance, Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) . that these models often display multiple equilibria and policy interventions can easily a¤ect equilibrium selection (see Blume (2006) ). We explore this possibility with a simple example.
Literature Review
Our research contributes to work in both criminal studies and economics. In an early study, Becker (1968) examines individual decisions to commit crimes from an economic perspective. 4 His cost-bene…t analysis is consistent with the rational choice approach used by Cornish and Clarke (1986), which we follow as well. 5 Our study also relates to subsequent work on the importance of social interactions in motivating criminal behavior (see, e.g., Ballester, Calvo- Our work is also related to Espejo, Huillier, and Weber (2011), who provide an evaluation of hot spot policing by using a leader and follower model, as we do in this investigation.
However, our aim and approach di¤er from theirs. Speci…cally, we want to characterize crime displacement in a simple (and testable) way in order to provide new insights to guide further empirical research. In this study, we assume that people observe the police allocation and make subsequent choices regarding criminal decisions and locations. Laezar (2006) shows that it may be optimal, under precise circumstances, to keep police allocation secret. Though our model is quite di¤erent from his-for instance, we introduce social interactions-it is important to remark that our results remain unchanged if we allow for randomized police allocations. The reason is that the e¤ect of police enters people's utilities in a linear fashion.
It would be interesting to study the advantages of secret police allocation in a model similar to the one of Laezar (2006) but with the additional feature of social interactions. We leave 4 See also Ehrlich (1973) . 5 Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010) provide a general description of criminal choices at the individual level to understand the implicit assumptions in aggregate crime regressions. They highlight the relevance of modeling the microfoundations of the empirical analysis of crimes. this analysis for future research.
Braga and Wisburd (2010) o¤er a deep analysis of place-based policies to crime …ghting. 6 In addition to new interesting insights about hot spots and crime prevention, they provide a thorough and updated overview of the theoretical and empirical research regarding this topic.
Our theoretical modeling assumptions are inspired by all their discussions and the literature therein, and the implications we derive are consistent with the empirical …ndings they describe.
On the applied side of the literature, Fu and Wolpin (2013) perform a structural estimation of the e¤ects of police reallocation on crime reduction. Their model does not contemplate the possibility of displacement of criminal activity, which is one of the main aspects of our analysis. Our theoretical results provide some justi…cation to their modeling assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 presents our main …ndings. Section 4 evaluates the decision of an enforcement agency that aims to reduce crime by changing the attributes of a certain area. Section 5 discusses three extensions of our model. Section 6 concludes. We collect all proofs in the Appendix.
The Model

Main Variables
This subsection describes the main variables of our model, making a clear distinction between the features that we assume are exogenous to the incumbents (i.e., people and the enforcement agency) and those that are under their control. Sections 4 and 5 examine some extensions to this initial model structure.
Exogenous Variables
We let N and M represent the size of the mass of people and police, respectively. There are K alternative areas where criminal activity can take place. With only a slight abuse of notation, K represents the set as well as the number of locations. These areas di¤er with respect to three attributes, namely, size of the area, risk of apprehension, and productivity of the criminal activity.
S k refers to the geographic size of Area k (e.g., in square feet). Riskiness R k is a probability measure of the successful apprehension of o¤enders in Area k. Di¤erences in riskiness across areas capture di¤erent characteristics of the areas that re ‡ect the level of police search activity or the ability of police to capture o¤enders. For example, better lighting may increase the risk of apprehension as o¤enders are more likely to be seen by someone who might call the police. Conversely, the presence of nearby highways may reduce this risk, as it becomes easier for criminals to escape. We use f to indicate the fee an o¤ender must pay if apprehended.
The fee (f ) could capture, for instance, the opportunity cost of time spent in prison.
Productivity A k captures the richness of the area in terms of expected bene…ts to criminals.
For example, a rich area may be a neighborhood that is populated by high-income people whose houses contain high-value items. It may also be a location with stores or banks available as potential targets.
Endogenous Variables
The incumbents in the model are the people and the law enforcement agency. Speci…cally, people decide whether to commit a crime and, if they do so, where to perform the criminal act. In our model, p k represents the fraction of people in N who decide to commit a crime in location k. We indicate the density of o¤enders in that location by
The enforcement agency decides how to assign police resources to di¤erent areas. We let q k denote the fraction of police resources in M that is assigned to location k; consequently e k = q k M=S k is the corresponding police density. We assume M=S k 1, for all k 2 K, so that the per capita apprehension rate (de…ned below) lies between 0 and 1.
Payo¤s of People
We model encounters between police and o¤enders as a random process, such that the overall rate of apprehension in location k is given by
Furthermore, the per capita apprehension rate of an o¤ender in location k is represented by
It follows from the last two expressions that the expected penalty for a person who commits a crime is
Thus, the cost-side of each individual's analysis depends on both his perceived probability of being apprehended and the penalty he would have to pay in that case. 7 (In Sub-section 5.2,
we allow for congestion e¤ects in the cost-side of the crime decision. These congestion e¤ects can be motivated by the fact that a police o¢ cer cannot be at two places at the same time;
thus, as the criminal activity in a certain area increases the probability of being apprehended in that area shifts down.)
On the other hand, the o¤ender's expected bene…t of committing a crime is
It follows that the expected payo¤ of the criminal act increases with the productivity of the area; by contrast, it decreases with the number of o¤enders in the area, as the total potential productivity has to be shared among more people.
Thus, the overall expected utility of an o¤ender in location k is given by
Recall that our model allows people not to commit a crime. This outside option can be thought of as the possibility to work in a legal activity. Under this interpretation, the number of people who opt not to commit a crime comprises the labor supply in the economy. To simplify the exposition, we initially assume the expected payo¤ of this outside option is 0.
We relax this restriction in Subsection 5.1 to evaluate the impact on crimes of public policies that a¤ect the labor market in the economy. We refer to the outside option as k = 0, so that U (0) 0 and the choice set of each person is
The outcome of their decisions is a probability vector p (p k ) k2K 2 K 0 where
Thus, N p 0 represents the number of people who decide not to commit a crime. 7 Durlauf and Nagin (2011) suggest that increasing the perceived risk of apprehension seems to have considerable deterrent e¤ects on crimes.
Payo¤s of Police Allocation Strategies
The public authority decides how to assign the police to di¤erent locations. Speci…cally, it
If the purpose of the enforcement agency is to minimize the overall level of criminal activity, then its payo¤ function is represented by
In our subsequent analysis, we contrast the behavior of a public authority interested in reducing the overall crime rate to that of a public authority aiming to minimize criminality while it keeps an even distribution of crimes across areas. The latter could be interpreted as an extreme version of implementing hot spot policing.
Structure of the Game
We model interactions between incumbents by using a leader and follower game, with the public authority as the leader and potential o¤enders as the followers.
In this game, the public authority …rst decides how to assign police to di¤erent locations with the objective of reducing the overall crime rate. This problem can be speci…ed as follows
Upon observing the distribution of police, each person, taking as given the decisions of the others, decides whether to commit a crime and, in that case, where to perform the criminal act. Thus, the problem faced by each person is
In the next section, we solve the game using the standard backward induction principle.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
People 0 s Choices
The second stage of the game is itself a game among potential o¤enders. We use Nash equilibrium as our solution concept. Given a strategy pro…le p, we let b(p) indicate the best-response correspondence of an arbitrary person, that is,
It follows that p (q) 2 K 0 is a Nash equilibrium if, for each k 0 2 K 0 , we obtain
Given an initial police assignment and some beliefs regarding crime location, all people face the same choice set and expected payo¤s. Thus, any action that is selected with a strictly positive probability will be among the options with the highest expected value. Since people are indi¤erent across these possibilities, we can interpret p (q) as either an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies or a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (see Hugie and Dill (1994) ).
To simplify notation, we de…ne k
We can now describe, for each police assignment q, the distribution of criminal activity across areas.
Proposition 1 Fix some q 2 K . The proportion of the population that decides to commit a crime in location k, for each k 2 K, is given by
with u (q) 0. Moreover, p 0 (q) > 0 if and only if P k2K k =q k < 1; in which case u (q) = 0. The unique equilibrium is globally evolutionary stable.
Remark u (q) is the utility level obtained by each person at the second-stage equilibrium when the police assignment is q. In addition, requiring
Thus, in our model, some people will opt not to commit a crime (p 0 (q) > 0) only if the mass of police is large enough. This scenario is consistent with observed crime behavior.
Proposition 1 shows that the criminal activity in a certain location increases with the perceived productivity of the area and decreases with both its apprehension risk and the number of police o¢ cers in place. This proposition allows us to determine the patterns of displacement of criminal activity across locations as the public authority changes the initial police allocation. We elaborate next on this description.
Displacement Let Q q 2 K : P k2K k =q k < 1 and assume this set is non-empty. 8 For all q 2 Q and all k 2 K, we get U (k; p k (q) ; q k ) = 0 and p k (q) = k =q k : That is, when the mass of police is large enough, the outside option (not to commit a crime) regulates the second-stage equilibrium payo¤s of potential o¤enders, and the level of criminal activity in each area depends only on the amount of police assigned to that speci…c area (rather than on the whole vector of police allocation). This means that, if q k increases, then location k becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders and its criminal activity decreases. Increasing q k in and of itself does not induce any initial displacement of criminality from Area k to the other areas. However, we do observe an increase in crime in other areas due to the removal of police from the latter. In other words, the displacement e¤ect occurs in our model because, in order to increase the police force in Area k, the law enforcement agency has to reduce it in other areas, which then experience an increase in crime rates. This displacement mechanism changes when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects. We evaluate this possibility in Subsection 5.2 and state an important implication of this alternative speci…cation for the econometric analysis of the e¤ect of police on criminal activity.
As mentioned before, the literature on criminality de…nes a hot spot as an area with above-average level of crime relative to the entire space. Assuming p 0 (q) > 0, we get from Proposition 1 that Area k is a so-called hot spot if and only if
Thus, in our model, whether Area k is a hot spot depends on both the productivity-to-risk ratio of the area and its density of police. Sherman (1995) writes "Drake Place was a "hot spot" of crime. It was so hot that the police said they stayed away from it as much as possible, unless they got a call." 8 It can be easily shown that Q is a convex set.
The structural characterization of hot spots we o¤er revises the causality of this expression.
The next section evaluates e¢ cient and egalitarian police allocations.
E¢ cient and Egalitarian Police Assignments
The last subsection described the behavior of potential o¤enders given di¤erent police assignments. Using this result, we now characterize the optimal distribution of police (q (q k ) k2K )
for a public authority whose goal is to reduce the overall rate of criminal activity. We then compare the optimal policy with one that targets hot spots until they disappear.
=N f is the minimum mass of police such that p 0 > 0:
We assume M > M as, otherwise, the problem of the enforcement agency is trivial.
Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal amount of police in each area depends on both the productivity-to-risk ratio and the size of the area. This proposition also implies that, at equilibrium, the ratio of criminal densities of Area k over Area l is given by
That is, though the public authority makes a greater e¤ort in areas that are a priori more attractive to o¤enders, this extra e¤ort is not enough to eliminate the e¤ects of their initial attribute di¤erences. Therefore, areas that are a priori more attractive remain so in an e¢ cient police allocation. In other words, our model contains hot spots as an equilibrium outcome.
Hot Spots Let M > M . Area k is a hot spot at the e¢ cient equilibrium if and only if
We next examine the case in which the goal of the enforcement agency is to obtain an even distribution of criminal activity across all areas (i.e., d k = d l for all k; l 2 K). To this end, we assume that the available mass of police is large enough to induce some people to opt for the outside option at the egalitarian allocation. This result holds for all
Under this assumption, we obtain the following speci…cation, for
Comparing this egalitarian policy with the e¢ cient allocation strategy, we obtain
That is, the egalitarian approach targets areas that are a priori more attractive to o¤enders more intensively than does a public authority who aims to reduce overall crime levels. This leads to our next proposition.
Proposition 3 (Opportunity Cost of Egalitarian Policy
The opportunity cost of equity in terms of overall crime levels is given by
Proposition 3 indicates that the opportunity cost (in terms of criminal activity) of implementing an extreme hot spot policing strategy increases with the variability of the productivityto-risk ratio across locations.
The next example illustrates our results so far and anticipates the analysis in the next section.
Example 1: Let K = f1; 2g, A 1 = 8, A 2 = 4, R 1 = 1, R 2 = 2, S 1 = S 2 = 1; f = 1 and N M > 20. Thus, Area 1 is both more productive and less risky than Area 2. Furthermore,
Given that M N > 20, by Proposition 1, the e¢ cient policy solves
with 1 = 8=M N and 2 = 2=M N . Figure 1 exhibits a graphical representation of this result.
In this …gure, the constraint set is denoted by the bold line. The two curves can be thought of as di¤erent indi¤erence curves: each displays combinations of q 1 and q 2 that induce the same level of criminal activity and higher indi¤erence curves are associated with lower crime levels.
Figure 1: E¢ cient versus Egalitarian Police Allocation Strategies
We de…ne an e¢ cient allocation as one that occurs whenever the marginal e¢ cacy of police resources is the same across areas. Upon a simple calculation, we obtain that this holds whenever
Using the fact that q 1 + q 2 = 1, we get q 1 = 2=3 and q 2 = 1=3. This police assignment corresponds to the upper-left intersection in Figure 1 . Under this allocation, p 1 = 12=N M > 6=N M = p 2 , meaning that Area 1 is a hot spot at equilibrium.
In contrast to the e¢ cient allocation strategy, the egalitarian policy satis…es the following condition:
Using the constraint, we obtain q 1 = 4=5 and q 2 = 1=5. This police assignment corresponds to the lower-right intersection in Figure 1 . Note that these two intersections coincide if only if
Under the egalitarian allocation, p 1 = p 2 = 10=N M . Thus, by construction, there are no remaining hot spots. However, as Figure 1 shows, the egalitarian allocation is on a lower indi¤erence curve. The opportunity cost of this policy in terms of crime level is 2=N M .
Note that, if we increase either the penalty in case of being caught (f ) or the amount of police (M ), then both 1 and 2 decrease by the same percentage. Thus, while in these two scenarios the police allocation remains the same, the indi¤erence curves get re-leveled with the induced criminal activity curves shifting downward. Alternatively, if we reduce 1 by reducing productivity (A 1 ) and/or increasing riskiness (R 1 ), then the criminal activity shifts downward by 1=q 1 (this follows by applying the envelope theorem to expression (1)). This change ‡attens the indi¤erence curves, so that now both the e¢ cient and the egalitarian allocations entail a lower q 1 and a higher q 2 . This means that structural changes in Area 1 have bene…cial spillover e¤ects on crime levels in Area 2 via subsequent police reallocation. The discussion in the next section elaborates on this argument.
Modifying the Attributes of the Areas
This section extends our model to consider an enforcement agency that aims to change the characteristics of places that give rise to criminal opportunities while sustaining an optimal police allocation. Speci…cally, we are interested in two questions: (i) What is the e¤ect of changing the attributes of an area on the overall rate of criminal activity? and (ii) What is the impact on the criminal level of the areas not directly bene…ted by such a policy?
The question of how to best …ght crime has received both academic and practical consideration. For example, Braga and Wisburd (2010) state that the aim of place-based policy strategies should go beyond hot spot policing. In their own words "We should solve the conditions and situations that give rise to the criminal opportunities that sustain high-activity crime places."
Similarly, public authorities have instrumented a number of area changes to increase apprehension risk or decrease productivity potential. These measures include, for instance, improving the lighting in dark areas or inking store merchandise.
To illustrate such initiatives, notice that by Proposition 1 (assuming M > M ) the problem of the enforcement agency regarding the allocation of police resources is as follows
Note that lowering the productivity-to-risk ratio in Area k is similar to decreasing k : By applying the envelope theorem on (2), we then obtain
Thus, slightly reducing k increases the number of people who opt not to commit a crime by 1=q k . We next elaborate on the mechanism by which this change happens.
Speci…cally, there are two forces behind the last result that reinforce each other. First, the target area becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders and, therefore, its criminal activity naturally diminishes. Second, by using Proposition 2 we get that, for each l 6 = k,
This means that the police force is optimally reallocated from Area k to the others, thereby reducing the criminal activity in these areas as well. We conclude by saying that structural changes in a certain area have bene…cial spillover e¤ects on all other locations via subsequent optimal police reallocations.
Extensions of the Model
In this section, we consider three natural extensions of our initial framework. While the …rst two modify the way in which we model the outside option, the last one changes the nature of the interaction e¤ects among potential o¤enders.
Outside Option and the Labor Market
In our model, the expected payo¤ of the outside option (not to commit a crime) is assumed to be 0. This restriction simpli…es our exposition without changing the two main implications, namely, the nature of the displacement of criminal activity and the characterization of hot spots. Nevertheless, it impacts both the e¤ectiveness of the public authority in reducing the overall crime rate and the optimal police allocation. To formalize this e¤ect, we extend Proposition 2 with U (0) c, so that c measures the opportunity cost of committing a crime.
This speci…cation leads to the next result.
where M , q k and p k are de…ned as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 states that a higher opportunity cost of committing a crime facilitates the condition under which p 0 (q) > 0 and reduces the level of criminality in all locations.
As we mentioned above, the outside option could be thought of as the possibility to work in a legal activity. Under this interpretation, the number of people who opt not to commit a crime comprises the labor supply in the economy. Thus, an increase in c could correspond, for instance, to a decrease in the unemployment rate or an increase in the minimum wage.
Consistent with the empirical evidence, we …nd that the criminal activity decreases when labor market conditions improve. Alternatively, improvements in the attributes of areas would also induce more potential o¤enders to choose the outside option, therefore increasing the labor supply of the economy.
Congestion E¤ects in the Outside Option
Our previous analysis rules out the possibility of congestion e¤ects in the outside option.
However, we can imagine a simple mechanism by which the opposite is true. For instance, when the number of people searching for a legal job increases, salaries may be pushed down or unemployment increased, thereby making this outside option less attractive. This possibility reduces the e¤ectiveness of the police force to …ght crimes.
In this section, we incorporate congestion e¤ects in the outside option by assuming U (0; p 0 )
A 0 =d 0 . Under this speci…cation, the model does not have a closed form solution neither for people's choices conditional on police assignments nor for the optimal police allocation. Nevertheless, it still delivers relevant information regarding both the displacement mechanism and the characterization of hot spots at the optimal allocation of police resources. We start by describing the implication of congestion e¤ects on the displacement mechanism.
k 2 K and all m 2 K with m 6 = k, we get @p k (q) =@q k 0 and @p m (q) =@q k 0:
Proposition 5 states that increasing police resources in Area k reduces its criminal activity, but it also increments the criminal level in all other locations. The reason is as follows: When q k increases, location k becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders, and this pushes some criminals to the outside option. When the value of this outside option is independent of the number of people who decide not to commit a crime, there are no further consequences.
However, when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects, the value of not to commit a crime decreases, incentivizing people to commit crimes in other locations. This has the undesired e¤ect of shifting p m (q) up in all other areas. We next describe an econometric challenge raised by Proposition 5.
Estimates of Crime-Reducing E¤ect of Police Academics have long studied the relationship between the scale of policing and the level of criminal activity by using panel data.
The …rst few studies on this issue did not …nd evidence of a strong causal e¤ect of police on crimes. As Levitt and Miles (2007) explain, one of the reasons behind such disappointing result is that early studies did not take into account an endogeneity bias. Namely, jurisdictions with higher crime rates react by hiring more police, and this response induces a positive cross-sectional correlation between police and crimes. Marvell and Moody (1996) and Levitt (1997) address this di¢ culty by using an approach based on Granger causality, and Lazzati (2013) proposes a partial identi…cation approach that relies on the use of police resources as monotone instrumental variables. 9 Proposition 5 poses a new identi…cation challenge. Under congestion e¤ects in the outside option, the crime rate in each area depends not only on the police resources assigned to that location but also on the whole vector of police allocation. That is, if congestion e¤ects prevail, then any study that uses cross-sectional data to evaluate the e¤ect of police on crimes should implement a simultaneous equations approach.
The next result shows that some hot spots still remain at the optimal police allocation in the presence of congestion e¤ects in the outside option. It also states that whether an area is a hot spot depends on its productivity-to-risk ratio in the same way as when U (0) 0:
Area k is a hot spot at the e¢ cient equilibrium if and
This proposition corroborates that equilibrium hot spots are a robust feature of our model. 9 See also MacCray and Chal…n (2012).
Complementarities in Criminal Activity
In the previous analysis, the game induced in the second stage displays negative interaction e¤ects among potential o¤enders. We next evaluate the consequences of an alternative speci…cation.
The overall expected utility of an o¤ender in location k is given by
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to p k ; we obtain
We expect both derivatives on the right-hand-side of (3) to be (weakly) negative. Speci…cally, congestion e¤ects in the rewards are expected as the higher the number of criminals in an area, the lower the piece of the pie for each o¤ender. Congestion e¤ects in costs are also expected since one police o¢ cer cannot be at two di¤erent places at the same time. Therefore, the higher the number of criminals in a given area, the lower the probability that any one of them is apprehended (Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996) and Sah (1991) ). The sign of the total e¤ect will, thereby, depend on the relative size of these two forces. That is, for each
In our previous analysis, the second term dominates the …rst one, thereby inducing a congestion game among potential o¤enders. When the opposite holds, the second-stage game is a game of strategic complements. Such games often display multiple equilibria and involve coordination problems. In our case, all people may coordinate in the same option and police allocation choices can easily a¤ect the selected one. The possibility that policy interventions may a¤ect equilibrium selection is well-described by Blume (2006) for a discrimination model.
The next example applies this phenomenon to our model of crimes.
Example 2: Let K = f1; 2g, N = 1, and M = 1. We further assume that U (0) 0. In addition,
In this example, Area 2 shows greater apprehension risk than Area 1 and the second stage of the game displays strategic complementarities.
Speci…cally, when q 1 = q 2 = 1=2, the second-stage game has two Nash equilibria: p (1=2; 1=2) 2 f(1; 0; 0) ; (0; 1; 0)g : While these two equilibria imply the same level of utility for people (zero), the last one is much riskier for potential o¤enders. The reason is that the …rst equilibrium guarantees each person a payo¤ of zero independently of what other people choose. Alternatively, the second equilibrium gives each o¤ender a payo¤ of zero if and only if all other people follow the equilibrium strategy and select to commit a crime in Area 1. Otherwise, the payo¤ is negative. Thus, choosing not to commit a crime is a dominant strategy and it is, therefore, reasonable to predict that everyone will choose this option.
Let us now assume the public authority assigns all police force to the riskier area, so that q 1 = 0 and q 2 = 1: Though the equilibrium set does not change, the two predictions di¤er regarding expected payo¤s. While the payo¤ of coordinating not to commit a crime is zero, the payo¤ of coordinating to commit a crime in Area 1 is 1=2 for each o¤ender. Thus, it may now be reasonable to predict that people will coordinate in the second equilibrium. 
Final Discussion
Crime rates fell sharply in the U.S. during the 1990's, including both violent and property crimes. In NY City the fall was so strong that the media often refers to this phenomenon as the New York "miracle." This drop in crimes generated deep debates among crime experts and hot spot policing appears as one of the most cited explanations. 10 The main argument against focusing police resources on hot spots is that it would simply displace criminal activity from one area to another. We evaluate hot spot policing via a game theoretic approach with a special emphasis on the displacement mechanism. Our characterization of the displacement mechanism o¤ers new insights for the empirical analysis of the deterrent e¤ect of police on crimes. We …nd that, while areas that are initially more attractive for potential o¤enders should indeed receive more police resources, some hot spots still remain at the optimal allocation. Thus, further hot spot policing strategies should be carefully studied in terms of ultimate objectives. We …nally study alternative place-based policies that display attractive properties in terms of geographic spillovers of crime reduction. The mechanism by which the spillovers take place is particularly interesting: By making a target area less attractive for potential o¤enders, the public authority directly reduces its criminal activity. The spillover e¤ect is due to the subsequent optimal police reallocation from the improved area to the other ones, where the criminal activity diminishes as well. 
That is, if (p (q) ; ' (q) ; (q)) satis…es the following conditions:
It is readily veri…ed that the non-negativity constraints are non-binding, i.e., ' k = 0; for all k 2 K: Thus, the previous conditions reduce to
As a consequence, we need to consider only two cases, namely, ' 0 (q) > 0 and ' 0 (q) = 0:
for all k 2 K. However, this is possible if and only if there exists (q) > 0; such that P k2K p k (q) = 1. Note that
is decreasing in (q) and We now suppose ' 0 (q) = 0: This yields the following equation:
for all k 2 K. Since p 0 (q) 0, then P k2K k =q k 1 with strict inequality if p 0 (q) > 0:
Uniqueness follows as the potential function is strictly concave in p on K 0 . Sandholm (2010) shows that global evolutionary stability follows by the same condition.
Proof of Proposition 2 For M large enough, any e¢ cient police allocation satis…es the following condition:
U (k; p k (q) ; q k ) = 0:
Thus, for all k 2 K;
The problem of the public authority can then be posed as
In equation (4), the objective function is di¤erentiable and strictly concave for all q in the interior of K : Thus, the solution to (4) exists and is unique. Moreover, q is an equilibrium if it satis…es the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian:
In this case, (q ; ' ; ) satis…es the following conditions:
' k = ; for all k 2 K; ' k 0; q k 0 and ' k q k = 0; for all k 2 K; 0 and 1 P k2K q k = 0.
It is readily veri…ed that the non-negativity constraints are non-binding, i.e., ' k = 0 for all k 2 K: The characterization of q follows through a simple calculation.
To …nd M ; note that P k2K k =q k < 1 needs to hold for p 0 > 0 to be true. That is,
It follows that
Proof of Proposition 3
From the previous analysis we know that
Then,
By applying the Multinomial Theorem to the …rst term in the right hand side and expanding the second term, the last expression takes the form of
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this result is very similar to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, thus we omit it.
Proof of Proposition 5 Under this speci…cation, for all q 2 Q, people will re-distribute across options till the utility obtained in each of them is the same. Therefore, p 0 = S 0 A 0 =N u (q) and, for each k 2 K, we have
where u (q) is the constant that solves P with respect to q k we get
By the Implicit Function Theorem applied to P k2K 0 p k (q) = 1 we get
Substituting the last expression in the previous two, we obtain that @p k (q) =@q k 0 and @p m (q) =@q k 0:
Proof of Proposition 6 At the second stage equilibrium, p 0 = S 0 A 0 =N u (q) : Thus, maximizing p 0 is the same as selecting the vector q that minimizes u (q) : It follows that any optimal q must satisfy, for all k; m 2 K, @u (q) =@q k = @u (q) =@q k :
Using intermediate results from the proof of Proposition 5 we get that, for all k; m 2 K,
Thus, for each k 2 K, we have
and the result follows immediately.
